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Impact of Metric Selection on Wireless
DeAuthentication DoS Attack Performance
Jonny Milliken, Member, IEEE, Valerio Selis, Kian Meng Yap, Member, IEEE, and Alan Marshall, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—DeAuthentication Denial of Service attacks in Public
Access WiFi operate by exploiting the lack of authentication of
management frames in the 802.11 protocol. Detection of these
attacks rely almost exclusively on the selection of appropriate
thresholds. In this work the authors demonstrate that there are
additional, previously unconsidered, metrics which also influence
DoS detection performance. A method of systematically tuning
these metrics to optimal values is proposed which ensures that
parameter choices are repeatable and verifiable.
Keywords—Denial of Service, DeAuthentication, Intrusion De-
tection, Metrics, Security, WiFi.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IFI is an insecure protocol, vulnerable to the threat ofDenial of Service (DoS). DoS attacks can be considered
to compromise the availability of a network, through either
resource exhaustion (Flooding DoS) or protocol abuse (DeAu-
thentication DoS). Current approaches to defeating DeAuthen-
tication (DeAuth) DoS attacks in literature have attempted to
develop suitable detection algorithms [1] [2]. The effectiveness
of these algorithms however is highly dependent on the data
which is being used to fuel them [3]. As a result there has
been a trend in more recent publications towards identifying
and classifying the metrics which are best for DeAuth DoS
detection [3] [4].
Much of the work on metric selection has concentrated on
the effects seen in the application and network layer [1] [4].
Work in [3] however has identified a set of features that are
applicable to WiFi, recognising that Layer 2 is an area of
limited investigation in current research. What is lacking from
current works is information on the parameters or bounds of
these metrics. Some research has prioritised the features under
consideration, but there is no identification of what values the
metrics or features should take on to detect an attack [3] [4].
Underpinning the importance of parameter bound selection
for DoS metrics is the appreciation of the effect that thresholds
and windowing factors can have on performance [1]. The
effect of thresholds is investigated in [5], showing that the
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choice of the value for this parameter must be both dynamic
and considered unique for each deployment. Windowing refers
to the selection of data under consideration of an algorithm,
usually determined as number of packets in a given timeframe.
While effect of varying this window is considered to influence
the outcome of a detection algorithm [6], it is not always taken
into account in WLAN experiments [2] [3] [7].
The effect of varying the bounds in these values on detection
outcome has been investigated at higher layers. If threshold
values and metric parameters are set too high then valid detec-
tions can be missed, while if they are set too low then a larger
number of false alerts can be generated, which obfuscates the
real security concerns [5]. The same effect is observed for
windowing, if the window of data under consideration is too
small then larger attack chains may be missed, while too large a
window size wastes computational resources and can obfuscate
attacks amongst normal data [8].
II. WIFI DEAUTHENTICATION DOS
In 802.11 all Layer 2 management frames are broadcast in
plain text so that nearby devices can discover the network and
request a connection. Many security issues arise from this lack
of protection however. If an attacker captures these plaintext
management frames they can forge packets which appear to
originate from a victim. Two potential frame types which
can be used for causing a DoS condition in 802.11 WiFi are
DeAuth and DisAssoc (DisAssociation) frames. Reception of
either of these frames moves the victim out of the authenticated
state in the AP state machine (See Figure 1) and into another
state which does not allow for exchange of data packets.
DeAuth frames are more damaging than DisAssoc as they
move the device two levels back in the state machine, thereby
taking longer for the client to reconnect, meaning the DoS
lasts slightly longer. For Client DeAuth attacks [9] considered
here, Deauthentication frames are masqueraded to appear to
originate from a client, notifying the AP that the victim no
longer wishes to maintain a connection.
The typical approach for detecting DeAuth DoS attacks in
WiFi is to monitor traffic in the network and invoke a threshold
for the number of DeAuth frames observed. If the number
of observed packets is above this threshold then an alert is
generated. In many instances this threshold is chosen by human
experience, i.e. best guess or calculated based on traffic in the
network [10]. This calculation is typically determined by the
level of expected frames under normal operation. Anything
above this level is classified as abnormal.
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III. LIVE WIFI DATA COLLECTION
To investigate the impact of WLAN MAC-layer algorithm
metrics on DoS detection performance, a data collection
system was designed and deployed in the Sunway Pyramid
Shopping Mall in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. More information
about the specifics of the data collection system is outlined
in [11], as are the motivations and challenges associated with
design and deployment of a live WiFi monitoring installation.
Data collection is restricted to 802.11 Layer 2 MAC frames
as this alleviates many of the confidentiality and user privacy
issues that can act as barriers to working with live network
data. In many cases these are the primary concerns for network
owners and administrators. All monitored data is truncated to
allow for the MAC header to be dissected whilst ensuring that
all payload data is obfuscated.
IV. THE EFFECT OF PARAMETER ESTIMATION ON
DEAUTHENTICATION DOS DETECTION
When assessing the presence of DoS attacks in a live
802.11 network additional parameters are needed to provide
information on the accuracy and duration of the attack:
• Window Size: To assess whether the number of packets
exceeds a threshold then a moving window limit must
be established, which determines the number of packets
under consideration. If the packet window is too small,
then the algorithm can miss out possible DoS packets, if
it is too long then the algorithm can accumulate packets
that are unrelated.
• Event time: Upon detection of an attack, the timeframe
for which the attack is considered to be ongoing is
difficult to determine. Should another attack be discov-
ered immediately after the previous alert, would this be
considered evidence of an ongoing attack or a new attack
altogether? A level needs to be established where an
attack can be considered terminated. Choice of this level
constitutes a trade-off between duration and frequency
of threat.
Fig. 1. 802.11 Summary of Authentication State Machine
TABLE I
STATIC AND VARYING PARAMETER VALUES (TH - THRESHOLD, WS -
WINDOW SIZE, ET - EVENT TIME
Varying Parameter
TH (Packets / Sec) WS (Packets) ET (Sec)
TH 2-20 5 5
WS 5 1-10 5ParameterValue
ET 0.1 0.1 0.1-0.6
TABLE II
MAXIMUM INCREASES IN DEAUTH DETECTIONS DEPENDING ON
VARIATION IN PARAMETERS
Parameter Maximum Increase
Event Size 249%
Window Size 728%
Threshold 213%
These attributes are considered atomic parameters inherent
in the majority of detection algorithms. Varying them has a
currently un-quantified effect on the ability of an algorithm
to detect attacks, particularly in live WiFi deployments. The
values of these two parameters, as well as the algorithm
threshold, are varied, during which time the other parameters
remain fixed, as outlined in Table I. Results of this analysis
are shown in Figures 3-5, where each graph indicates the
percentage increase in DoS detections relative to the minimum
value observed. Days where no attack events are observed have
been removed from the figures.
Each of the Figures show an increase in the number of
DoS detections observed as the parameters are varied, as high
as 700% in the case of window size. Note that of the three
parameters, the variance in threshold displays the smallest
variability. This indicates that event time and window size are
larger influences on detection performance than the threshold.
Deviation in DoS detection occurs in spikes throughout the
capture, creating larger deviations concentrated on specific
days. It is anticipated that this is a result of larger influxes
of DeAuth frames at these times, making the algorithm more
sensitive to changes. In instances where the volume of DoS
detections does not vary, it is anticipated that these levels of
DeAuth frames are constant with normal traffic.
From Table II, the selection of different values can change
the volume of DoS detections by up to approximately 700%.
It is important to note that this work is not assessing the DoS
detection performance of the threshold algorithm employed.
This work has been concerned with demonstrating that selec-
tion of these previously unconsidered parameters changes the
DoS detection significantly.
It is possible that the reported numbers of attacks in Figures
3-5 contain false positives. This would indicate that the rate
of false positives is also susceptible to changes in these
parameters. It is expected that the variation in false negatives
would experience the same effect. Since the number of attacks
in the dataset is not known this cannot be determined.
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V. SYSTEMATIC SELECTION OF DOS METRIC
PARAMETER VALUES
The results show that there is a significant change in the
results of WLAN DoS detection depending on the value
of each of these parameters. However there is no current
means of reliably and systematically selecting a value for
these parameters. Accuracy is an important factor for detection
algorithms, but repeatability is also important. If selection of
the identified parameters is determined by human knowledge,
i.e. best guess, then it is reasonable that different observers may
choose different values. This makes experimental results more
difficult to replicate and validate. A more reliable approach
would be to apply a selection algorithm to determine these
values based on the dataset.
For the purposes of determining a parameter selection sys-
tem, the most appropriate selection is considered here to be at
those values which are most stable. A balance must be struck
between having a low enough value to cover attack scenarios
and a high enough value to reduce instability in the output.
Using the values from Figures 3-5 allows the determination
of possible settling points based on empirical data. Thus the
levels for all parameters can be determined rather than guessed,
by creating an algorithm to determine this settling point. The
algorithm employed here calculates the parameter selection by:
1) Calculate the average and standard deviation of percent-
age increase in DoS detections per day in the capture,
2) Test each of the parameter possibilities. If over the
capture period the selection value is higher than 1
deviation from the average for that day, that parameter
is excluded.
3) The selection is determined as the lowest parameter
which has not been excluded in step 2.
The algorithm is further explained in pseudo-code in Figure
2. The system proposed here is based on automatic selection of
parameter values for threshold, window size and event time,
listed in Table III. This generates more informed and stable
results but also allows independent researchers to arrive at the
same results for the same data set; parameters are no longer
guessed or attributed to expert knowledge but are based on
repeatable processes.
Fig. 2. Algorithm Pseudo Code
TABLE III
RECOMMENDED PARAMETER CHOICES
MS Window Size Event Time Threshold
1 2 0.2s 5 per sec
2 2 0.3s 3 per sec
3 2 0.3s 1 per sec
4 2 0.3s 5 per sec
VI. CONCLUSION
Selection of parameters is an important aspect of DeAuth
DoS detection ; however for WLAN attacks the only parameter
currently considered is the threshold. This work identifies two
additional factors which influence the performance of a DoS
detection algorithm; window size and event time. In order to
ensure reliable and repeatable selection of these parameters in
any environment, this work has proposed a parameter selection
system which identifies parameter bounds based on stability
of the dataset. This ensures that researchers are not reliant
on human expertise, i.e. best guess, and conclusions based on
traffic results are more reliable and replicable.
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Fig. 3. Variation in DoS Detection Outcome Based on Event Time
Fig. 4. Variation in DoS Detection Outcome Based on Window Size
Fig. 5. Variation in DoS Detection Outcome Based on Threshold Value
